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8 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
9 **SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**
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11 ANTHONY ARTHUR BUSH,
12 CDCR # J-85079,

13 Plaintiff,

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15 vs.
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18 R.J. DONOVAN WARDEN; A.L. COTA;
19 FACILITY IV LIEUTENANT; FACILITY
20 IV CAPTAIN,

21 Defendants.
22

Civil No. 12cv2573 GPC (NLS)

ORDER:

**(1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO PROCEED *IN
FORMA PAUPERIS*, IMPOSING
NO PARTIAL FILING FEE AND
GARNISHING \$ 350 BALANCE
FROM PRISONER'S TRUST
ACCOUNT PURSUANT
TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)
[ECF No. 2];**

**(2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR
FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b)**

23 Anthony Arthur Bush ("Plaintiff"), an inmate currently incarcerated at Calipatria State
24 Prison located in Calipatria, California, and proceeding in pro se, has filed this civil rights action
25 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Plaintiff has not prepaid the \$350 filing fee mandated by 28
26 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead he has filed a Motion to Proceed *In Forma Pauperis* ("IFP") pursuant
27 to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 2].
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I.

MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of \$350. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff's failure to prepay the entire fee only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). *See Rodriguez v. Cook*, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, prisoners granted leave to proceed IFP remain obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether their action is ultimately dismissed. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); *Taylor v. Delatoore*, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), a prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a "certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); *Andrews v. King*, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the Court must assess an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the prisoner must collect subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month's income, in any month in which the prisoner's account exceeds \$10, and forward those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has no available funds from which to pay filing fees at this time. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that "[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee."); *Taylor*, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a "safety-valve" preventing dismissal of a prisoner's IFP case based solely on a "failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds

1 available to him when payment is ordered.”). Therefore, the Court **GRANTS** Plaintiff’s Motion
 2 to Proceed IFP [ECF No. 2] and assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
 3 However, the entire \$350 balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded
 4 to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C.
 5 § 1915(b)(1).

6 **III.**

7 **SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)**

8 The PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding
 9 IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused
 10 of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or
 11 conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as
 12 practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these
 13 provisions of the PLRA, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof,
 14 which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who
 15 are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; *Lopez v. Smith*, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-
 16 27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); *Resnick v. Hayes*, 213 F.3d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 2000)
 17 (§ 1915A); see also *Barren v. Harrington*, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing
 18 § 1915A).

19 “[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all
 20 allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the
 21 plaintiff.” *Resnick*, 213 F.3d at 447; *Barren*, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2)
 22 “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). In addition, the Court’s
 23 duty to liberally construe a pro se’s pleadings, see *Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept.*,
 24 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988), is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” *Ferdik v.*
 25 *Bonzelet*, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). However, in giving liberal interpretation to a
 26 pro se civil rights complaint, the court may not “supply essential elements of claims that were
 27 not initially pled.” *Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska*, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th
 28 Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations

are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” *Id.*

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Liability

Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 1983; *Nelson v. Campbell*, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S. Ct. 2117, 2122 (2004); *Haygood v. Younger*, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).

B. Statute of Limitations

As an initial matter, it appears that Plaintiff’s claims fall outside the applicable statute of limitations. Because section 1983 contains no specific statute of limitation, federal courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions. *Jones v. Blanas*, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004); *Maldonado v. Harris*, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 2004); *Fink v. Shedler*, 192 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1999). Before 2003, California’s statute of limitations was one year. *Jones*, 393 F.3d at 927. Effective January 1, 2003, the limitations period was extended to two years. *Id.* (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 335.1). The two-years limitations period, however, does not apply retroactively. *Canatella v. Van de Kamp*, 486 F.3d 1128, 1132-22 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing *Maldonado*, 370 F.3d at 955).

Unlike the length of the limitations period, however, “the accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law.” *Wallace v. Kato*, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007); *Hardin v. Staub*, 490 U.S. 536, 543-44 (1989) (federal law governs when a § 1983 cause of action accrues). “Under the traditional rule of accrual ... the tort cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitation begins to run, when the wrongful act or omission results in damages.” *Wallace*, 549 U.S. at 391; *see also Maldonado*, 370 F.3d at 955 (“Under federal law, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.”).

Here, Plaintiff raises claims that occurred between October of 2008 to January 30, 2009. (*See* Compl. at 1.) This was the time frame that Plaintiff was housed at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) for a period of time so that he could appear for an evidentiary

1 hearing in San Diego. Thus, Plaintiff would have reason to believe that his constitutional rights
2 were violated four years ago. *Id.*; *see also Maldonado*, 370 F.3d at 955. However, Plaintiff did
3 not file his Complaint in this case until October 22, 2012, which exceeds California's statute of
4 limitation. *See* CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 335.1; *Jones*, 393 F.3d at 927. Plaintiff does not allege
5 any facts to suggest how or why California's two-year statute of limitations might be tolled for
6 a period of time which would make his claims timely.

7 While prisoners normally receive an additional two years of tolling of their claims due
8 to their incarceration, Plaintiff is serving a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. In
9 support of his claims, Plaintiff addresses his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus that he filed in
10 *Bush v. Pliler, et al.*, S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 01cv0142 J (NLS). A court "'may take notice of
11 proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those
12 proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.'" *Bias v. Moynihan*, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225
13 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting *Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc.*, 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)); *see*
14 *also United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc.*, 971 F.2d 244,
15 248 (9th Cir. 1992). In California, this tolling provision applies only to plaintiffs "imprisoned
16 on a criminal charge, or in execution under the sentence of a criminal court for a term of less
17 than for life." *Jones*, 393 F.3d at 927 (citing CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 352.1(a)). In Plaintiff's
18 Petition, Plaintiff acknowledges that he is serving a sentence of life without the possibility of
19 parole. *Bush v. Pliler, et al.*, S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 01cv0142 J (NLS) (ECF No. 1 at 1.)
20 Thus, because Plaintiff is serving a life sentence, he is not entitled to the extra two years of
21 statutory tolling. This means that he has two years from the date by which he claims his
22 constitutional rights were violated to file this action. In Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint,
23 those dates range from October of 2008 to January of 2009.

24 Generally, federal courts also apply the forum state's law regarding equitable tolling.
25 *Fink*, 192 F.3d at 914; *Bacon v. City of Los Angeles*, 843 F.2d 372, 374 (9th Cir. 1988). Under
26 California law, however, a plaintiff must meet three conditions to equitably toll a statute of
27 limitations: (1) he must have diligently pursued his claim; (2) his situation must be the product
28 of forces beyond his control; and (3) the defendants must not be prejudiced by the application

of equitable tolling. *See Hull v. Central Pathology Serv. Med. Clinic*, 28 Cal. App. 4th 1328, 1335 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); *Addison v. State of California*, 21 Cal.3d 313, 316-17 (Cal. 1978); *Fink*, 192 F.3d at 916. Here, however, Plaintiff has failed to plead any facts which, if proved, would support the equitable tolling of his claims. *See Cervantes v. City of San Diego*, 5 F.3d 1273, 1277 (9th Cir. 1993).

C. Respondeat Superior claims

Plaintiff names the RJD Warden, Associate Warden, Facility Lieutenant and Facility Captain as Defendants in this matter but fails to set forth any specific factual allegations with regard to these Defendants in the body of Plaintiff's Complaint. Thus, it appears that Plaintiff seeks to hold these Defendants liable in their supervisory capacity. However, there is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. *Palmer v. Sanderson*, 9 F.3d 1433, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993). Instead, "[t]he inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation." *Leer v. Murphy*, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing *Rizzo v. Goode*, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976)). In order to avoid the respondeat superior bar, Plaintiff must allege personal acts by each individual Defendant which have a direct causal connection to the constitutional violation at issue. *See Taylor v. List*, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

Supervisory prison officials may only be held liable for the allegedly unconstitutional violations of a subordinate if Plaintiff sets forth allegations which show: (1) how or to what extent they personally participated in or directed a subordinate's actions, and (2) in either acting or failing to act, they were an actual and proximate cause of the deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. *Johnson v. Duffy*, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). As currently pleaded, however, Plaintiff's Complaint fails to set forth facts which might be liberally construed to support an individualized constitutional claim against any of the named Defendants.

D. Access to Courts

Plaintiff alleges that his right to access to the courts has been denied because prison officials interfered with his attempts to file a temporary restraining order. (*See Compl.* at 23-24.)

1 Prisoners do “have a constitutional right to petition the government for redress of their
2 grievances, which includes a reasonable right of access to the courts.” *O’Keefe v. Van Boening*,
3 82 F.3d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1996); *accord Bradley v. Hall*, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995).
4 In *Bounds*, 430 U.S. at 817, the Supreme Court held that “the fundamental constitutional right
5 of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing
6 of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate
7 assistance from persons who are trained in the law.” *Bounds v. Smith*, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977).
8 To establish a violation of the right to access to the courts, however, a prisoner must allege facts
9 sufficient to show that: (1) a nonfrivolous legal attack on his conviction, sentence, or conditions
10 of confinement has been frustrated or impeded, and (2) he has suffered an actual injury as a
11 result. *Lewis v. Casey*, 518 U.S. 343, 353-55 (1996). An “actual injury” is defined as “actual
12 prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing
13 deadline or to present a claim.” *Id.* at 348; *see also Vandelft v. Moses*, 31 F.3d 794, 796 (9th Cir.
14 1994); *Sands v. Lewis*, 886 F.2d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 1989); *Keenan v. Hall*, 83 F.3d 1083, 1093
15 (9th Cir. 1996).

16 Here, Plaintiff has failed to alleged any actions with any particularity that have *precluded*
17 his pursuit of a non-frivolous direct or collateral attack upon either his criminal conviction or
18 sentence or the conditions of his current confinement. *See Lewis*, 518 U.S. at 355 (right to
19 access to the courts protects only an inmate’s need and ability to “attack [his] sentence[], directly
20 or collaterally, and ... to challenge the conditions of [his] confinement.”). In addition, Plaintiff
21 must also describe the non-frivolous nature of the “underlying cause of action, whether
22 anticipated or lost.” *Christopher v. Harbury*, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002).

23 In short, Plaintiff has not alleged that “a complaint he prepared was dismissed,” or that
24 he was “so stymied” by any individual defendant’s actions that “he was unable to even file a
25 complaint,” direct appeal or petition for writ of habeas corpus that was not “frivolous.” *Lewis*,
26 518 U.S. at 351; *Christopher*, 536 U.S. at 416 (“like any other element of an access claim[,] ...
27 the predicate claim [must] be described well enough to apply the ‘nonfrivolous’ test and to show
28 that the ‘arguable’ nature of the underlying claim is more than hope.”). While Plaintiff claims

1 he was unable to file a temporary restraining order, his allegations are devoid of any claim that
 2 he was unable to file a complaint, appeal or petition for writ of habeas corpus. Therefore,
 3 Plaintiff's access to courts claims must be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which
 4 section 1983 relief can be granted. *See Lopez*, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; *Resnick*, 213 F.3d at 446.

5 **E. Fourteenth Amendment**

6 Plaintiff also claims that the RJD's administrative grievance procedure violates his right
 7 to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. (*See Compl.* at 4-6.) The Fourteenth
 8 Amendment provides that: "[n]o state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
 9 without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "The requirements of procedural
 10 due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth
 11 Amendment's protection of liberty and property." *Board of Regents v. Roth*, 408 U.S. 564, 569
 12 (1972). State statutes and prison regulations may grant prisoners liberty or property interests
 13 sufficient to invoke due process protection. *Meachum v. Fano*, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976).
 14 To state a procedural due process claim, Plaintiff must allege: "(1) a liberty or property interest
 15 protected by the Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the interest by the government; [and] (3) lack
 16 of process." *Wright v. Riveland*, 219 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2000).

17 However, the Ninth Circuit has held that prisoners have no protected *property* interest in
 18 an inmate grievance procedure arising directly from the Due Process Clause. *See Ramirez v.*
 19 *Galaza*, 334 F.3d 850, 869 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[I]nmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement
 20 to a specific prison grievance procedure") (citing *Mann v. Adams*, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.
 21 1988) (finding that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment creates "no legitimate
 22 claim of entitlement to a [prison] grievance procedure")); *accord Adams v. Rice*, 40 F.3d 72, 75
 23 (4th Cir. 1994) (1995); *Buckley v. Barlow*, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993).

24 In addition, Plaintiff has failed to plead facts sufficient to show that prison official
 25 deprived him of a protected *liberty* interest by allegedly failing to respond to his prison
 26 grievances in a satisfactory manner. While a liberty interest can arise from state law or prison
 27 regulations, *Meachum*, 427 U.S. at 223-27, due process protections are implicated only if
 28 Plaintiff alleges facts to show that Defendants: (1) restrained his freedom in a manner not

1 expected from his sentence, and (2) “impose[d] atypical and significant hardship on [him] in
 2 relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” *Sandin v. Conner*, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995);
 3 *Neal v. Shimoda*, 131 F.3d 818, 827-28 (9th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff pleads nothing to suggest how
 4 the allegedly inadequate review and consideration of his inmate grievances resulted in an
 5 “atypical” and “significant hardship.” *Sandin*, 515 U.S. at 483-84. Thus, to the extent Plaintiff
 6 challenges the procedural adequacy of inmate grievance procedures, his Complaint fails to state
 7 a due process claim.

8 Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a section 1983 claim
 9 upon which relief may be granted, and is therefore subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
 10 §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b). The Court will provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to amend
 11 his pleading to cure the defects set forth above. Plaintiff is warned that if his amended complaint
 12 fails to address the deficiencies of pleading noted above, it may be dismissed with prejudice and
 13 without leave to amend.

14 III.

15 CONCLUSION AND ORDER

16 Good cause appearing therefor, **IT IS HEREBY ORDERED** that:

17 1. Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 2] is
 18 **GRANTED.**

19 2. The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or his
 20 designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the \$350 balance of the filing fee
 21 owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty
 22 percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court
 23 each time the amount in the account exceeds \$10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
 24 ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER
 25 ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

26 3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Matthew Cate,
 27 Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515 S Street, Suite 502,
 28 Sacramento, California 95814.

